

**USAID/CENTRAL ASIA REGIONAL
ANNUAL REPORT 2002**

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CLOSE-OUT REPORT
for
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1.3

SO Name:	Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprises
Approval date:	April 1997
Geographic Area / Countries:	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Total cost:	\$128,217,000
Funding account:	Freedom Support Act
Actual or estimated counterpart contributions:	\$1,570,004
Best available estimate of other partner resources that contributed to results achievement:	\$3,205,425
Principle implementing partners:	Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund, ACDI/VOCA FINCA Eurasia Foundation Booz Allen & Hamilton ARD/Checchi IRIS OSC Carana Chemonics FMI Mercy Corps

Fair, formal structures for the regulation of a market economy with the private ownership of capital were very foreign concepts before and shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Activities serving USAID/CAR's SO1.3, "Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprises" showed varying degrees of progress in establishing and developing the formal policies, institutions, capital, and human resources necessary to build and maintain working, capitalist systems. Much of this variation was due to differences in the level of commitment to reform across countries, and in some cases commitment to reform of specific agencies and counterparts within a country. The variation in progress has shown very clearly what aspects of this broad-based strategy we should focus on for success in the new strategy period.

Activities under the new USAID/CAR Strategy are a natural progression from those under SO1.3. While national policy issues will continue to be addressed as needed, there will be greater emphasis on reforms at the microeconomic level. A new, sharper focus on the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector reflects studies of proven growth worldwide, and represents a great potential for economic expansion in Central Asia. Our new SO1.31, "Improved environment for the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises" emphasizes activities in finance, education, and legal administration that will promote growth in the SME sector.

Indicators for SO1.3 measured the increase in private sector market share through three Intermediate Results (IRs):

- Improved operational environment for private sector growth;

- Human resources improved to function in a market economy; and
- Increase in availability of and access to capital and technological resources for private sector.

A wide gamut of measures were used in monitoring these IRs:

- Number of improved policies, laws, and regulations that ensure competition and allow easy market entry and exit;
- Number of businesses and business advocacy groups strengthened through USAID/CAR activities;
- Number of USAID-trained professionals employed in courts and administrative agencies to strengthen enforcement of policies, laws, and regulations;
- Percent of media broadcasting time devoted to market transition issues;
- Compliance with IFI conditions;
- Number of people trained to function in a market economy; and
- Dollar volume of loan and joint venture funds invested.

Although these indicators were useful for monitoring programs, they did not fully capture progress on the strategic objective. The benchmark-building system developed for indicators under the new strategy reflects a deeper, more comprehensive analysis that better measures progress on our manageable objectives. Over the previous strategy period, there were no significant changes to the results framework for SO1.3.

Activities under SO1.3 generally reflected the indicators for achievement. Identification and reduction of obstacles to private enterprise was a first step toward further market reform across Central Asia. As mentioned earlier, this activity bore much fruit in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but was pared back to all but the lowest level of reform in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (it was still in its nascent stages in Tajikistan). This activity will continue as needed. Training and education activities were generally successful across the region, and will continue and expand. Microcredit activities prospered well in the last strategy period, and reflect part of the decision to focus on the SME sector. Larger lending was problematic in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and will not continue.

Results varied greatly country to country with regard to almost all of these indicators. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, legal and regulatory reforms and financial systems are, for the most part, in place for general economic growth. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, on the other hand, we overestimated the will of the governments to make the reforms necessary for a market economy. Only training and limited microcredit activities showed any success in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Although the Tajik government has demonstrated its commitment to economic reform, the security situation is still very tenuous. Activities there started more recently, and have focussed more on microcredit and business education. Our new strategy removes our dependency on the government will so lacking in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, while still allowing us to move forward from the macroeconomic successes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

We see no real threats to the sustainability of USAID/CAR successes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Obviously, capricious government actions could prove a threat to what limited success was seen in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Again, the new strategy, for the most part, removes this threat, as very little activity there will depend on government cooperation. This overestimation of government will was probably our biggest lesson learned. Tajikistan's proven commitment is promising, but its security situation makes for very little capacity for movement at present, and other security priorities must take a front seat before large-scale reforms can be effected.

List of evaluations and special studies conducted during the life of the SO that provide annual assessments

1.3 Market Transition - Private Enterprise Growth

Commercial Law Assessment,
Accounting Assessment,
Accounting Assessment,

Kaz	Kyr	Taj	Tur	Uzb
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May 1999

December 1998

August/Sept 1998

Privatization Assessment					May 1998
Lessons Learned Conference on Accounting					April 1998
Accounting Assessment					April 1998
Accounting Assessment					May/June 1997
Accounting Assessment					January 1997
Public Sector Accounting Needs Assessment					May 1999
Investment Climate in the Atyrau Oblast					January 2000
Investment Climate in the South Kazakhstan					October 1999
Economic/Business Education					February 2000
Legal, regulatory and administrative barriers to SMEs					August 1999
Current Investment Environment Evaluation					February 1999

Nearly all of the implementation agreements under SO1.3 have reached their completion date. None, however, have yet submitted close-out reports. The agreement through ACDI/VOCA was folded into SO1.31 as part of the new strategy implementation, and closes in 2004.

Names and contact point of individuals who were directly involved in various phases of the SO (planning, achieving, and assessing and learning), and who would be good sources of additional information:

Gary Linden, USAID/Kiev
Ted Lafarge, USAID/Bulgaria
Paul Davis, USAID/Kosovo
James Neeley, jneeley@law.com

CLOSE-OUT REPORT
For
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1.5

SO Name: A More Economically Sound and Environmentally Sustainable Energy System as the Primary Engine of Growth for Central Asia

Approval date: April 1997

Geographic Area / Countries: Central Asia

Total cost: \$21,058,399

Funding account: Freedom Support Act

Actual or estimated counterpart

Contributions: \$120,000

Best available estimate of other partner resources that contributed to results achievement: \$3,300,000

Principle implementing partners: Hagler-Bailly

Minerals Management Service,
US Energy Association,
Academy for Educational Development

The collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991 left the parts of the unified power system of Central Asia spread among five countries. Each individual country was left with electricity resources insufficient to supply their populations. Each nation depended to some degree on its neighbor for generation capacity, transmission networks, or necessary ancillary services such as reserves and regulating capacity. This Strategic Objective (SO) laid the policy groundwork for the restructuring of the Central Asian energy sector. More remains to be done, but much still depends on the commitment of the various government bodies to implement and enforce the policies that USAID helped to put into place. The successes that we have seen as part of this objective are only qualified successes until the policy regime is implemented and enforced. USAID/CAR has developed a new strategy that builds on this policy base and continues to work with policy development, but adds as a major element building government commitment to and public demand for their *implementation*. Our new SO1.6, "Improved management of critical natural resources, including energy," reflects a move toward more management-level interventions through training, public awareness, and tangible demonstrations of new, more effective technologies and processes, and applies these to the energy sector. Although the new SO is region-wide, it is tailored to meet the needs of the unique situations in each of the five republics.

Indicators for this SO measured toward an informal Mission Objective, "An effective policy framework in place to achieve private investment in an environmentally sound, regional efficient, market oriented energy sector." They included legislative and regulatory framework issues for restructuring toward privatization; increased regional trade and IFI/private investment in utilities; transparent pricing, competition, accounting standards, and market mechanisms; and regional negotiations of terms of trade for energy commodities.

Of these, we saw the best results with private investment in energy and resources; a legal and regulatory environment conducive to private investment; and in the active engagement of regional groups in negotiating terms of trade for energy commodities.

We saw mixed results where restructuring and privatization of the energy sectors and establishment of independent regulatory entities were concerned, as various countries performed at different levels, if at all. Results were worst with regard to pricing and cost of service issues, and with agreements on energy trade or infrastructure.

The only changes to the Results Framework for this SO were adding our “Mission Objective” statement, deleting one SO-level indicator (for increased export of energy commodities outside Central Asian Region), and one result regarding unbundling. We also re-organized two separate result statements that combined policy and restructuring issues under one single result statement. The regional Results Framework does not show that we added Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, to our area of activity in 1997.

Although they were generally indicative of what this objective needed to achieve, all of the indicators chosen for this objective were difficult to measure, and none at the time were well enough defined to be perfectly adequate. The MO-level indicators were particularly problematic. “Increased IFI and private investment in oil, gas, coal and power” could not take proper account of the several significant mergers that took place in the flurry of market activity resulting from privatization. And “Increased regional trade in same energy commodities between Central Asian Republics” simply could not be measured satisfactorily, due to the high volume of trades in barter, informal networks, etc.

Activities centered around the results that we hoped to achieve. They helped prepare Central Asia for the privatization of the energy sector through the development of policies that formed the legal framework for privatization. USAID facilitated partnerships between US and Central Asian regulatory agencies to demonstrate proper regulatory functions in a market economy. USAID also assisted the host government regulators and suppliers in methods to provide better quality, access, and affordability for gas, electric, and heat utilities in the region.

As of this objective’s last reporting period, privatization in Kazakhstan grew remarkably. The GOK privatized almost 100% of industry, along with over 80% of the electricity generation capacity and nine major coal mines. Joint ventures accounted for 2/3 of all oil pumped. Kazakhstan also agreed to privatize all regional electricity distribution companies and separate these entities from the state-owned generation capacity. USAID helped to increase the capacity of the Kyrgyz State Energy Agency and the Kazakh Anti-Monopoly Commission to manage tariff issues. USAID supported the development of regional agreements on water/energy sharing, including a high voltage transmission system across the five countries and the parallel operations agreement that includes mandates for a competitive power market. The Government of Turkmenistan had adopted a complete set of implementing policies for oil and gas sector, and Kazakhstan was planning for new international exploration investments.

However, despite all the agreements and other policy actions, very little implementation of new legislation and regulation has taken place to date. Our efforts to restructure and privatize state-owned enterprises have not served the larger goal of greater transparency. There are no impartial regulatory bodies – a crucial element in a market environment. And managers lack both the skills to operate commercially-oriented firms, and the incentive to implement any new reforms.

Furthermore, there is no public commitment for any market reform in the energy sector. There is a great fear (not unfounded) that reform will lead to loss of jobs and increased tariffs, and there is very poor understanding of the need for improved energy efficiency.

USAID/CAR, through its new Strategic Objective 1.6, “Improved management of critical natural resources, including energy,” plans further policy assistance, but will place more emphasis upon building both technical and administrative capabilities for local level implementation. Training through SO1.6 will build on the policy base already in place, and provide lower-level natural resources officials with a stronger basis for decision-making through better data collection systems, stronger partnerships with U.S. policy specialists, and better public relations skills. To complement and reinforce this training, we are demonstrating the viability of the management concepts and new technologies in selected problem areas. These small-scale demonstration models will provide a jumping-off point for future local replication, as they will be built at low-cost, and of locally-available materials. Public education and awareness are a large part of this effort.

List of evaluations and special studies conducted during the life of the SO, including R4 reports that provide annual assessments:

"An Assessment of Water Management in Central Asia and Recommendations for Future USAID/CAR Technical Assistance" / Vahid Alavian, Jack Keller, Frederick Guymont; December 1999.

"Energy Sector Assessment: Central Asia Republics" / Robert Ichord and Theodore Streit; September, 1999.

"Feasibility Assessment: Supporting Increased Energy Efficiency in Kazakhstan" / Bechtel National, Inc.; September 1999.

"USAID/CAR Activities In Global Climate Change" / Ken McNamara; February 2000.

"Improved Hydrometric Forecasting and River System Operation for the Aral Sea Basin" / Vahid Alavian; February 2000.

"Water Resources Management Training for Central Asia" / Vahid Alavian; February 2000.

List of instrument close-out reports prepared per ADS 202.3.8 for contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements:

Final reports for Hagler-Bailly (ends 3/31), AED (with USAID/CAR/PPS), and MMS and USEA (both managed out of Washington).

CLOSE-OUT REPORT
for
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1.6

SO Name: Improved environmental management capacity to promote sustainable economic growth

Approval date: March 1998

Geographic Area / Countries: Central Asia

Total cost: \$11,140,679
Funding account: Freedom Support Act
Actual or estimated counterpart contributions: \$80,000
Best available estimate of other partner resources that contributed to results achievement: \$1,700,000

Principle implementing partners: Harvard Institute for International Development, International Resources Group, Academy for Educational Development, CH2M Hill

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left many newly independent states with the consequences of some egregious environmental failings. Activities serving USAID/CAR's SO1.6, "Improved environmental management capacity to promote sustainable economic growth" showed substantial progress in mitigation of some of these consequences. However, the potential for further significant impact through such policy-focussed activities is doubtful. USAID/CAR determined that a change in direction was warranted that would guide activities toward more local level *implementation* of these policies. We also determined that the regional approach was no longer the best way to effect change in this sector, and that a country-by-country approach would work better.

Activities under the new USAID/CAR Strategy continue to work with policy development, but add as a major element building government commitment to and public demand for *implementation* of the policies put into place as part of the old strategy. Our new SO1.6, "Improved management of critical natural resources, including energy," emphasizes management-level interventions through training, public awareness, and tangible demonstrations of new, more effective technologies and processes, and applies these to the energy sector.

Indicators for the previous SO1.6 measured:

- agreements in water use, water sharing, and water management, and water user associations in the Aral Sea Basin;
- laws and regulations governing oil operations in the CAR portion of the Caspian Sea, and USAID/CAR partnerships established to bring about these policies; and
- the number of climate change mitigation policy measures approved and implemented, and NGO advocacy on the part of climate change mitigation.

Of these, results were strongest with regard to oil and gas legislation, international climate change requirements, and the growth of environmental NGOs.

Although there were some bilateral and multilateral water use management agreements put into place, our results were more disappointing with regard to long-term water management agreements. Our indications are that water user associations were making progress, but their sheer number and their varied and localized nature make this difficult to confirm on a large scale. A more selective or targeted

indicator may have been more useful. Results that concerned local-level water management were generally disappointing, as were results in market-oriented environmental management and pricing practices for water and energy. Partnership initiatives, although they resulted in some good regulation, have proven unsustainable.

The indicators selected were generally useful in determining management direction and for reporting requirements (with the exception of the water user associations indicator). There were no significant changes in the Results Framework during the life of this SO.

Activities reflected the indicators chosen, with initiatives aimed toward:

- Management of Aral Sea water resources (developing international agreements and the ability to implement their provisions through better resource management);
- The protection of the Caspian Sea environment from the effects of petroleum sector exploration (development of an environmental regulatory framework on petroleum production and transportation, and partnerships with US and local regulatory agencies and environmental NGOs), and
- Global climate change (policy & technical analysis to benefit from UNFCCC).

USAID adopted a regional approach because the most acute environmental issues are transboundary in nature and are a source of political tension and economic rivalry among the Central Asian republics. We believed that they could not be resolved at the national level.

The republics of Central Asia signed several multi- and bi-lateral water management agreements during the life of this SO. The Government of Kazakhstan prepared high quality environmental analyses required for membership to Annex I and Annex B at the UNFCCC's 5th Council of Parties, and Uzbekistan began this analytical process for its own membership. By the end of this SO cycle, both Central Asian Caspian countries, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, were well along in the process for new legislation and regulation that would bring their oil operations up to international standards.

However, several issues arose or became more evident over the course of the objective that will threaten the sustainability of some activities. Partnerships are based on the theory that USAID can serve as a catalyst to begin relationships that will result in in-depth discussion and comprehension of various issues. The assumption that these relationships will continue without USAID is, in our experience, false. Due to language barriers, unreliable local resources, and other obstacles, once USAID pulls away and turns issues over to the partners for discussion, discussion ends. We also underestimated the heated differences with regard to water management. This issue remains a potential threat to regional security.

Our biggest lesson, though, concerns the issue of post-legislative activity. Government bodies in the region have adopted many good, progressive policies in this sector, but rarely implement those policies, and lack the institutional capacity for their monitoring and enforcement. It is also worth noting that backing environmental legislation in this region is very much an uphill battle. Tangible incentives evident with energy legislation (especially financial incentives) are very thin with regard to environmental legislation, making it very difficult to see through to passage.

List of evaluations and special studies conducted during the life of the SO, including R4 reports that provide annual assessments:

"An Assessment of Water Management in Central Asia and Recommendations for Future USAID/CAR Technical Assistance" / Vahid Alavian, Jack Keller, Frederick Guymont; December 1999.

"Energy Sector Assessment: Central Asia Republics" / Robert Ichord and Theodore Streit; September, 1999.

"Feasibility Assessment: Supporting Increased Energy Efficiency in Kazakhstan" / Bechtel National, Inc.; September 1999.

"USAID/CAR Activities In Global Climate Change" / Ken McNamara; February 2000.

"Improved Hydrometric Forecasting and River System Operation for the Aral Sea Basin" / Vahid Alavian; February 2000.

"Water Resources Management Training for Central Asia" / Vahid Alavian; February 2000.

List of instrument close-out reports prepared per ADS 202.3.8 for contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements:

Harvard Institute for International Development (with USAID/Washington's Europe and Eurasia Bureau),
International Resources Group (ends 3/31/01),

Academy for Educational Development (USAID/CAR/PPS),

CH2M Hill (with USAID/Washington's Europe and Eurasia Bureau)

CLOSE-OUT REPORT
for
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2.1

SO Name:	Increased, Better Informed Citizens' Participation in Political and Economic Decision-making
Approval date:	March 1998
Geographic Area / Countries:	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
Total cost:	\$32,253,910
Funding account:	Freedom Support Act
Actual or estimated counterpart contributions:	\$126,400
Best available estimate of other partner resources that contributed to results achievement:	\$7.9 million
Principle implementing partners:	American Bar Association National Democratic Institute International Foundation for Electoral Systems Counterpart International Internews ISAR

USAID/CAR's 1997-2000 Strategy period saw notable progress in the development of civil society and some improvement in the availability of information. A portion of this progress can be attributed to USAID/CAR's Strategic Objective (SO) 2.1, Increased, better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making. Progress in other areas of this SO, however (e.g., parliamentary independence, major reforms toward freedoms of speech and association, etc.), was limited to specific institutions in different countries. To address these successes and shortcomings, USAID/CAR shifted the emphasis of its democracy and media strategy away from formal systems of political and public decision making to broader, more basic components of a democratic polity at the grassroots level and to targeted institutions where opportunities were present.

Initial indicators for SO2.1 measured the number of advocacy NGOs, the percentage of citizens who felt informed, and the number of parliament members who were members of NGOs. Three intermediate results (IRs) factored in a myriad of other lower-level indicators:

- "NGOs engaged in strengthening civil society" measured NGO capacity in terms of quantity and management, and enabling legislation for NGO formation and operation;
- "Information on domestic economic policies and politics available" measured availability of domestic television/radio news through the quality, management capabilities, and quantity of independent sources, as well as strengthening print media; and
- "Increased responsiveness and accountability of Government to citizens/citizen organizations" measured the consideration of externally-generated input to draft laws and policies, increased government transparency (through open hearings and consultative processes), and increased government accountability (through elections, and constituent relations).

The breadth of information gathered toward this SO provided a useful tool for management decisions, activity re-direction, and new strategy development. These indicators allowed us to document and justify

an approach to democracy assistance in Central Asia that differs from models developed in other former Soviet-bloc countries. As the program developed, indicators changed together with the progress and new focuses. The NGO Sustainability Index, developed by E&E, replaced an old SO 2.1 indicator ("Number of advocacy NGOs") as it better captured development in the whole third sector. Two other SO-level indicators ("% of citizens who feel informed" and "Number of members of Parliament who are members of NGOs") were replaced with Media Sustainability Index and "Ratio of number of contacts by NGOs on government decisions that have positive reception to total number of such contacts." The latter indicated effectiveness of social partnerships between NGOs and the government better than the original one. For similar reasons, some IR indicators were also revised.

While the program continued, we closely monitored implementation of the Performance Monitoring Plan, and a few adjustments and deletions were made with respect to problematic indicators. "Increased willingness of independent media to report on democratic processes and public policy issues" was eliminated when logistical difficulties made it too difficult to obtain data. In addition, some adjustments were made with respect to particular countries. For example, all election-related indicators were eliminated in Uzbekistan, when all election assistance was stopped there.

Our new Strategic Objective 2.11, "Strengthening democratic culture among citizens and target institutions", demonstrates a shift from a focus on formal systems of political and public decision making to a broader consideration of general political development. It addresses the fact that democracy building requires more than facilitating simple political transition and providing tools to progressive reformers committed to change. Activities under the new strategy focus on more fundamental attitudinal changes that will increase popular demand for change by fostering political will and commitment for reform.

IRs for the new SO reflect this change in the tenor of USAID/CAR's democracy and media assistance, through: stronger and more sustainable civic organizations; increased availability of information on civic rights and domestic public issues; and enhanced opportunities for citizen participation in governance. A number of discreet indicators have been compiled into a series of scorecards and indices for the new SO.

Activities across Central Asia reflected the IRs for SO 2.1 outlined above, and were generally geared toward strengthening the NGO and independent media communities, rule of law, parliaments, and elections. Despite some improvements in voting procedures, elections throughout Central Asia fell far short of international standards, and assistance in this area is now limited to maintaining contact with election commissions and encouraging reform in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Modest assistance to political parties is being provided in a very limited form in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Parliamentary assistance varied country to country, and will for the most part only continue in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where there is the most promise for reform. Although parliaments are more open to input from civic organizations, and public hearings, town hall meetings and candidate debates took place, these windows of opportunity for increased government accountability are the focus of the new IR 2.1.3.

Media assistance activities centered around quality and quantity of the electronic media sources. We did see a higher caliber of journalists in this strategy period, as well as general growth in the number and capacity of independent stations. However, government control issues limited progress. New activities will stress alternative information outlets, increased local production, and will promote the longevity of independent media via legal assistance and support to media and journalists' organizations. New activities in civic education will serve as another avenue for building awareness. The growth of the NGO sector in Central Asia was perhaps our biggest success. In all five republics this sector is growing, developing strong networks, and becoming better advocates for reform. USAID/CAR will continue its work with NGOs, but will emphasize local-level impact, youth, and women in the coming strategy period.

Despite the progress seen in Central Asia at some levels, major reforms to guarantee freedom of speech and association, or transparent and democratic processes, remain absent. Overtly political civic organizations, political parties, media outlets, and labor unions all continue to face strong resistance and even periodic repression from most Central Asian governments. The legislative branches of each country, for the most part, remain highly dependent upon the nations' executive branches. All of these

issues will remain obstacles to democratization, and would have hampered the sustainability of our initiatives had we not re-directed our efforts in the new strategy. Evaluative studies conducted in 1999 helped us to identify three broader problems impeding the development of democracy in the region that we believe are addressed in the new SO: a lack of citizen empowerment; a lack of information about alternatives; and mutual distrust between citizens and government.

It was noted in the strategy document for 1997-2000 that “As these political actors develop the capacity and prove themselves to be more effective advocates, they are likely to attract more popular interest and support – and also run the risk of provoking a repressive response by a government fearful of losing control of political developments.” The stated risk reflected an imminent “fork in the road” for Central Asia in terms of democratic reform, and proved sadly prophetic over the strategy period, perhaps even more broadly than expected. The risk was a necessary one, though, and the base established through SO2.1 activities provided a springboard for future success despite broader government failings.

List of evaluations and special studies conducted during the life of the SO, including R4 reports that provide annual assessments

	Kaz	Kyr	Taj	Tur	Uzb	
2.1 Democratic Transition						
Gender Assessment						July 1999
Civil Society Assessment, ENI/DG						February 1999
Electronic Mass Media Assessment,						January & July 1998
Mass Media Association Building Assessment						August 1999
Evaluation of Progress in Counterpart Consortium's Phase II Program BHR/PVC,						May 1998
Review of Internews. P. Graves, ENI/DG						January 1998
Participatory Evaluation of Counterpart Consortium Cooperative Agreement						December 1996
Anti-Corruption Assessment, Pavlodar oblast / DAI: J. Osborn and O. Harencar						August 1998
USAID/G/DG Trip Report: Assessment of programs in political processes and civil society / D. Black						September 1999
Media Coverage						January 1999
NGO and Private Sector, Research Report						November 1999
Civil Sector Development, External Assistance Strategies						December 1999

All contract, grant, and cooperative agreement mechanisms under SO 2.1 were continued under SO 2.11, and have not yet closed out.

Names and contact point of individuals who were directly involved in various phases of the SO (planning, achieving, and assessing and learning), and who would be good sources of additional information:

Alex Newton, USAID/Haiti, Director, Office of Democratic Transitions, 1996-2000
Eileen Wickstrom-Smith, State/W, Democracy Specialist, 1996-1998

Greg Koldys, USAID/CAR, Democracy Officer, 1997 –
Sean Roberts, srkstan@localnet.com, Democracy Specialist, 1998-2000
Rachel Neville, khantengri6995@localnet.com, Democracy Specialist, 1998-1999
Igor Tupitsyn, USAID/CAR, Project Management Specialist, 1998 –
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Steven Wingert, ISTI/TRG, Indicators Contractor, October 1997

USAID/CAR RESULTS FRAMEWORK

